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ABSTRACT 
This study looks at the relationship between charter school presence and neighborhood 
quality in Los Angeles. Using data from the Los Angeles Department of Education, 
Zillow Real Estate, and the Los Angeles Sheriff, this paper attempts to find whether 
changes in charter presence influence the price of surrounding real estate or the 
occurrence of serious and petty crimes. The results find that charter schools tend to be 
associated with a decrease in home sale prices. The results on crime imply that crime 
increases upon the opening of charter schools, however they are statistically insignificant.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 2009, a charter school named “Barack Obama Charter” opened its doors in the 
center of Los Angeles. The first of many named after the politician, the school was the 
175th charter launched in the county – a number that has increased to a striking 307 in the 
four years since.1 As the success of the city’s public schools continued on a downward 
slope throughout the 90’s, the system increasingly began to rely on alternatives to the 
traditional public school. Charter schools became a default solution; consequently their 
presence has steadily increased over the past two decades, making Los Angeles the 
densest and largest charter population in the country.2 Over the past 10 years less than 40 
charter schools have closed in the city, while 242 have opened: 
 
This paper will explore whether the rise in charters has any corollaries for the city in 
terms of real estate pricing and crime rates. Given that schools have direct effects on 
                                                          
1
 "Redirect to LAUSD Portal." Redirect to LAUSD Portal. Accessed November 25, 2013. 
http://notebook.lausd.net/ 
2
 Ravitch, Diane. "The Charter School Mistake." Los Angeles Times. October 1, 2013. Accessed November 
20, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/keyword/charter-schools. 
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population, I will explore how these effects manifest themselves in the Los Angeles 
area.34  
 This paper hypothesizes that school choice, modeled by the opening of charter 
schools in an urban neighborhood, will increase overall neighborhood quality. Given that 
charter schools add valuable education choice in an area, this paper anticipates that 
neighborhoods in which they are opened should become more desirable as a location for 
those concerned about the education of their children. Further, areas with quality school 
districts tend to have increasing price returns on housing value as quality increases.5 
While this may not be a causal relationship, I expect that charter schools and school 
choice should have similar effects on demand as increased quality does. In turn, the area 
should become a hub for families - a demographic more able to pay a premium on real 
estate prices, and less likely to commit serious crimes.6  
I recognize that charter schools likely have the largest effect on the under 18 
population, given that this is the demographic that attends said schools. The under 18 
population is less likely to commit serious crimes, and more likely to commit petty 
                                                          
3
 Clapp, John M.; Nanda, Anupam; and Ross, Stephen L., "Which School Attributes Matter? The Influence 
of School District Performance and Demographic Composition on Property Values" (2007).Economics 
Working Papers.Paper 200526. http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200526 
4
 Forrest, Monica, and Karen L. Alexander. "The Influence of Population Demographics: What does it 
Mean for Teachers and Teacher Education?" Journal of Family and Consumer Sciences Education, 
Fall/Winter, 22, no. 2 (2004): 69-71. Accessed November 22, 2013. 
http://natefacs.org/JFCSE/v22no2/v22no2Forrest.pdf. 
5
 Chiodo, Abbigail J., Rubén Hernández-Murillo, and Michael T. Owyang. "Nonlinear Effects of School 
Quality on House Prices." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June, 92(3) (May 2010): 185-89. 
Accessed November 22, 2013. http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/10/05/Chiodo.pdf. 
6
 United States. US Department of Agriculture. Expenditures on Children by Families, 2011. By Mark 
Lino. 2012. Accessed November 24, 2013. http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2011.pdf. 
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crimes.7 While crimes inevitably increase with population, petty crimes are more likely to 
increase proportionally than serious crimes. This is largely because the larger population 
creates an increased likelihood of serious apprehension. Further, the at-risk, under 18 
populace that charter schools tend to serve are more likely to commit petty crimes in 
general.8 Thus, if charter schools, as hypothesized, are effective in drawing a population 
to an area, the presence of the additional population should increase petty crimes and 
deter serious crimes. 
 This study selected Los Angeles as a test because the density of people and 
density of schools in Los Angeles mean that charter schools simply offer school choice. 
Suburban areas have a much smaller cap on the number of schools they can host than 
urban areas. If a suburban area only has the scope for three middle schools, for example, 
opening a charter school leaves room for only two public schools. In an urban area like 
Los Angeles the population can hold several thousand schools, meaning that the effect of 
opening a single charter school is marginal on the availability of other options. Charter 
presence in the area should not limit the ease or ability of parents to send their children to 
traditional schools.  
 John Horowitz, etc studied the effect of charter school presence on suburban area 
real estate in 2009 with a study that evaluated the charter population in the suburb 
                                                          
7
 Willits, Dale, Lisa Broidy, and Christine Denman. "Schools, Neighborhood Risk Factors, and 
Crime." Crime & Delinquency 59, no. 2 (March 2013): 292-315. http://www.jrsa.org/ibrrc/background-
status/New_Mexico/NM_SchoolsCrime.pdf. 
8
 "Explanations for Patterns of Crime: Age." Sociology Central. Accessed November 26, 2013. 
http://www.sociology.org.uk/pblsdca.pdf. 
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Toledo, Ohio.9 The study found “little evidence that the existence of a charter school 
affects property values.” Horowitz’ study however, observed under 50 charter schools 
with 253 home sale transactions. His study focused on a suburb where charter schools 
present a tradeoff from typical public schools given the carrying capacity of the 
population in which the study was conducted. This paper adds to Horowitz’s research by 
evaluating the same effect in an urban area with a larger sample. Given the differing 
nature of the schools in a city, the expectation is that the effect will be different. This 
paper also attempts to see if there are auxiliary effects of charter school openings on the 
safety of a neighborhood. 
 To this end, a 2005 study by Lisa Broidy and Dale Willits studied the influence of 
neighborhood schools on surrounding crime in Albuquerque, New Mexico.10 In the study, 
Broidy and Willits survey all public schools in Albuquerque to find that they correlate 
with a small but significant increase in crime. The study surveyed about 120 schools that 
are fairly spread out, more closely representing most suburban areas than the makeup of 
dense Los Angeles. The data substantiates the idea that the population of 18 and under is 
far less likely to commit or report serious crimes than the older population. This study 
will explore charters as a stimulus for changing crime within a population, while Broidy 
and Willits explored simply the proportion of crime by location. Moreover, because I am 
studying charter schools it seems highly possible that the areas with charters will only 
attract the educationally focused and the under 18 population, who are typically less 
likely to commit crimes. 
                                                          
9
 Horowitz, John & Keil, Stanley & Spector, Lee, 2009. "Do Charter Schools Affect Property Values?," 
The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 39(3), pages 297-316. 
10
 Willits, Dale, Lisa Broidy, and Christine Denman. "Schools, Neighborhood Risk Factors, and Crime." 
292-305 
9 
 
 The results of this study largely contradict the hypothesis of this paper. Instead I 
find that charter schools may have a significant negative effect on real estate prices. I also 
find that crimes undergo a slightly significant increase, matching the results of the Broidy 
and Willits study. However, petty crimes do decrease during school hours. A result that 
makes sense given that some portion of the possible perpetrators are likely to be in 
school.1112 These results indicate that the openings of charter schools cause a slight 
decrease in neighborhood quality. Alternative reasoning as well as possible explanations 
for this phenomenon will be discussed in this paper.  
 Section II will outline the history of the school choice movement and discuss the 
possible reasoning for the density of charter schools in the Los Angeles area. Section III 
will detail the sources of data, various limitations to the results of the model, and explain 
the methods used to arrive the results. Section IV will walk through the various models 
and regressions used in order to quantify the effect of charter schools on neighborhood 
quality, and detail the results of these models. Section V will describe potential reason 
for these results and their implications.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 United States. Virginia Department of Education. Improving School Attendance. By Anne J. Atkinson. 
August 2005. Accessed November 27, 2013. 
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/support/prevention/dropout_truancy/improving_school_attendance.pdf. 
12
 While juvenile delinquents are more likely to skip class regardless of school, it is nonetheless more likely 
that crime perpetrators be preoccupied during school hours. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The School Choice Movement and Charters 
When the school choice movement first grew in the 1980’s the focus was largely 
on school vouchers. The Reagan administration pushed for vouchers hoping that they 
would benefit low-income families whose children attended low-performing schools. The 
program soon became contentious for various reasons ranging from tax implications to 
possible religious entanglements. The opposition to voucher schools did nothing to 
temper the growing disenchantment with public schools, and through this conflict charter 
schools were born.  
Charter school performance in the US has increased a great deal over the past few 
years. While a 2009 study by the CREDO center at Stanford University found that charter 
schools generally perform worse than public schools, their 2013 update found that charter 
gains now place them ahead of public schools in several key criteria.1314 The original 
study found that charter school performance indicated the equivalent of 22 fewer days of 
math learning and seven fewer days of reading, where the 2013 update evaluated charters 
as equivalent to their public counterparts in math education, and eight days ahead in 
reading. Despite this substantial improvement, massive disparity between the 
performances of various charters persists – a phenomenon visible in the Los Angeles 
schools at which this study looks.  
Performance is central to the vitality of charter schools in Los Angeles. If charters 
are to signify school choice, they must theoretically have value equal to or above other 
                                                          
13
  Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) (2009, June). Multiple Choice: Charter School 
Performance in 16 States. Palo Alto: CREDO, Stanford University. 
14
 Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) (2013, May). Multiple Choice: Charter School 
Performance in 16 States. Palo Alto: CREDO, Stanford University. 
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schools. Thus, it is very possible that even charters with poor Academic Performance 
Index (API) scores represent a better alternative to the public schools closest to them. 
Bettering the education of students is essential in decreasing crime, as there is a strong 
link between school performance and decreased propensity towards breaking the law.15 
Safety and real estate, of course come hand in hand. While it is unclear which comes 
first, I find that creating a more educated environment will both decrease crime and 
increase the desirability of a neighborhood.  
Los Angeles and Charters 
 The school choice movement hit Los Angeles particularly hard. With over 300 
charters in Los Angeles County, the area makes up the most concentrated presence of 
charters in the country. It is possible that the series of education cuts that plagued 
California over the past several decades created rising unrest among parents. This 
disgruntlement made way for charter schools to populate the city.   
Charter schools are largely in the poorest neighborhoods, many populating areas 
of the city with median incomes hovering at the poverty line, and populations that are 
over 80% black or Hispanic –the most overrepresented groups in the bottom quintile of 
income earners and the top perpetrators of crime. These areas tend to have lower real 
estate values and high crime rates – a disparity that has only increased over the past 
decades. In 2007, the Center for Education Reform found that 54% of charter students 
qualified for free or reduced lunches, and over half of the students served by these 
                                                          
15
 Petrocelli, Matthew, and Joseph Petrocelli. "School Performance and Crime: Theoretical and Empirical 
Links." The Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice 2, no. 2 (2005): 119-31. 
http://swacj.org/swjcj/archives/2.2/Petrocelli.pdf. 
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schools are classified as ‘at risk.’16 In serving this sect of the population, charters tend to 
open in low-income, urban areas. This means that the control groups in this study, those 
with no charter presence, are likely to have lower crime rates and higher real estate 
values. This is evident in the regression where I find that areas without charter schools 
have an average 37% housing sale price increase, whereas areas with charter schools 
average at a 26% increase. This is at least partially accounted for, however, by zip code 
fixed effects, which allow us to normalize the variation. More importantly, this means 
that the effect of charter schools on real estate or crime could be important in finding the 
true value of charters in urban locales.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 “Annual Survey of America’s Charter Schools”, Center for Education Reform, April 2009, Retrieved 
July 27, 2009 
13 
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources 
 To test the possible relationships between school choice, crime, and real estate 
prices, this paper uses data from the following sources; the Los Angeles Office of 
Education, the Los Angeles Department of Education, the United States Census Bureau, 
Zillow Real Estate Research, and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s department.   
 Charter school location and quality data come from the Los Angeles Office of 
Education and the Los Angeles Department of Education. The office of education was 
able to provide a complete listing of the 307 active charter schools in the county, their 
complete street addresses and the dates on which they were opened. However, in my 
regressions not all of these schools were used due to limitations with available data. 
Instead, all real estate modeling was done using 296 of the schools for which zip code 
level real estate data was available, and all crime modeling was done using the 243 
schools for which zip code level crime data was available.   
 Real estate data for every zip code in Los Angeles was found through Zillow Real 
Estate Research. Through Zillow, I was able to find monthly median sale prices for 
homes in 296 zip codes throughout the Los Angeles area. Of these, 154 zip codes served 
as a control with no charter school presence. The months of information with data 
available date back to July 1997 and through to September 2013. I then condensed this 
data into yearly increments of median home sale prices. Real estate data was used with all 
data inflation adjusted to 2013 levels. Inflation adjustments were done using numbers 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. While this data is likely to have substitution 
14 
 
and quality biases, this paper expects that the inflation rates given will still be able to 
provide insight.  
 The Los Angeles Sheriff’s department provided all crime data. The crime data 
was logged by date and time going back to crimes reported since 2005. Only crimes 
reported to take place during or after the year of 2005 were used because the data for 
earlier years was incomplete. The Sherriff’s department provided information down to 
address and specific type for 357 zip codes used in this regression. Of these, 261 zip 
codes served as a control with no charter schools present. It is important to note that 
sheriff crime data is not contiguous, and often does not comprise entire zip codes. 
However, the sheriff’s purview has remained constant since the base year of 2005, so this 
paper believes that the crimes surveyed are still able to represent changes in crime 
through time. The crimes were then reclassified as Type 1 or Type 2 crimes as defined by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Type 1 crimes include the following: homicide, 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, and 
other felony. All other crimes were defined as Type 2. These crimes were modeled in 
three ways; regressing all crimes as a complete set, regressing only crimes that took place 
during school hours, and regressing only crimes that took place while schools were 
closed. School hours were considered as such; the hours between 7AM – 5PM were seen 
as times where schools were open, and all other hours were seen as times where schools 
were closed. The regressions specifying school times were done excluding the months of 
June through August, where school times vary greatly.  
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Limitations 
 Limitations of this model are largely caused by unavailability of certain data. The 
real estate data used came in the form of median sale price per zip code, and therefore 
was unable to account for many variables that influence fluctuations in home sale price. 
The data set did not specify the number of observations for any given median sale price, 
thus the fluctuations could easily be caused by the type of home being sold. If only 2 
homes were sold in a month in a particular zip code, for example, it is possible that one of 
them was the largest house in the area, skewing up our median home price. However, 
because the data gave up to 192 median monthly sale prices for a complete set, the trends 
observed were deemed to be relevant and usable. This paper assumes that homes in a 
single area are unlikely to vary greatly in the time immediately surrounding charter 
school openings. While some months in the historical data have no information given, it 
is unclear if this is due to lack of home sales or simply missing data. Because some zip 
codes are missing entire years worth of data, it seems likely that these omissions are 
caused by unavailability of data. Other limitations included crime data that only 
accounted for those zip codes accounted for by the county sheriff – omitting some of the 
areas where charter schools are present. This may create some bias based on the way in 
which the sheriff’s purview is designated.  
 Further, this study is limited by the availability of data concerning household 
income. While the household income was only available for three specific years that were 
used to linearly model all other years, this did not account for intra-decade fluctuations. 
Notably, this does not account for the fluctuation of the recession beginning in 2008. The 
recession likely also created large variation in real estate prices and crime. This 
16 
 
significant unaccounted influence deemed the linear model unusable. Instead, this paper 
uses median home sale prices for some crime models. However, given that I am testing 
whether charter schools impact home prices, this proxy is not entirely viable, and all 
regressions were also conducted without the variable. 
 Both dependent variables, crime and real estate prices, were inevitably also 
influenced by a variety of other factors. This may include increasing density in Los 
Angeles, which may drive up real estate prices; an age shift in Los Angeles to a younger 
generation as the city continues to urbanize; a growing tendency for only wealthier 
people to buy housing, thus also driving up the median; possible changes in the policies 
of the police department; the presence of a larger police force, etc. Further, Los Angeles 
has a large rental culture, meaning that many residents are not owners of their homes. 
However, I believe that real estate prices are a useful proxy because they are strongly 
related to rental prices. 
 Notably, all of the data used is influenced by the zip code level observations. Zip 
codes have harsh boundaries that may not account for the full affect that the presence of a 
school has on its neighborhood. Rather, if there is any effect of charter schools, it is likely 
that there would be spillover into the neighboring areas, beyond the lines of zip codes. 
Conversely, it is possible that zip code level observation is too far reaching, and that the 
possibility of any effects of charter schools would be limited to a smaller radius around 
the school.17 It is unclear, if charter schools were to have an effect, how vast that effect 
would be.  
                                                          
17
 It is worth noting that in an urban area, zip codes are fairly small. Visual representation of these zip codes 
can be seen in Map 1 and Map 2 
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 All of these limitations are acknowledged by this paper, but somewhat reconciled 
by the large sample set and the presence of many control areas. Appendix table 1 gives 
more details on the samples of non-charter and charter zip codes.  
 
Regression Methodology 
 In order to study any possible association between charter schools, crime, and real 
estate rates, this paper utilizes a basic panel regression.  
Real Estate 
The main goal of this model is to evaluate whether the trajectory of home sale prices 
changed to any degree after the opening of charter schools. In order to do this, a panel 
regression was used with two-way fixed effects: 
      	 
  	 …    	 …      
where  represents the dependent variable of median price of houses sold. 

  represents the explanatory variable of concern, the number of charter schools in the 
zip code;  is the dummy variable for each zip code; 	    represent the fixed effect 
for each distinct zip code; and  and 	    provide the dummy variable for each year 
and the fixed effect for each year respectively.  
Crime 
 To explore other potential subsidiary effects of the opening of charter schools, I 
attempt to define the relationship between charters and crime in the area. In order to do 
so, I run a similar panel regression in six different ways; I run regressions evaluating both 
Type 1 and Type 2 crimes in cases where schools were open, where they were closed, 
and one as a cumulative of the two: 
18 
 
      	 
      	 …    	 …      
Where all previous explanatory variables remain the same as the real estate regression, 
however,  represents the number of crimes in a zip code (of Type 1 and Type 2 
respective to the regression). Further,   is the median home sale price (used as a proxy 
for median household income). This variable will be indicated when used.18  
  
                                                          
18
 For both crime and real-estate a log-level model is also used, and the data is given in the tables included. 
The model assumes a decreasing effect of charter schools as changes in crime and real-estate increase. The 
model can be interpreted as: %∆  100	 ∆; this essentially means that for ever unit increase in 
independent variable x, there will be a 	 times 100 percentage point increase in dependent variable y. For 
example, if a log-level regression on Type 1 crime found .05 coefficient on charter schools, I would expect 
Type 1 crimes to increase by 5%. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Real Estate 
 Looking at the relationship between inflation adjusted median sale price of homes 
and the number of charter schools in an area, Figure 1 illustrates a persistent discrepancy 
between the home values of areas that do and do not have charter schools. Throughout 
each year I find that areas with a larger number of charter schools tend to have lower 
median sale prices for homes within their zip code. The distinct outlier in the two-charter 
school area of the graph comes from 1997, where in the zip code 91101 the inflation 
adjusted median home sale price was $4,935,759. While other zip codes also had 
seemingly inflated home prices during this time, 91101 is the clear outlier causing the 
distorted data point. This data point can be justified through the limitations in gathering 
the data set. Home prices in this data set are largely in the millions due to the urban area 
in which they are located. I expect that these are an accurate predictor of rental prices, a 
common occurrence in Los Angeles, because these typically depend on real estate value.  
 The panel regression that corresponds to this plot, found in Table 1, uses a binary 
variable for each of the 267 zip codes used in the sample. The data produces a coefficient 
of -$13,390.6 per charter school in an area, with a standard error of $3.269.50. I find that 
this model is significant at the .1% level. Therefore, there is compelling evidence 
suggesting that in Los Angeles the launch of a charter school is highly associated with a 
decrease in home values. This data also shows that beginning in 2000, the year in which 
charter schools open also becomes increasingly important, and is significant at the .1% 
level by 2001. Table 1 also gives log-level results for this panel; however, I find that 
20 
 
these results are not significant. Therefore, the following analysis will focus on the basic 
panel regression.  
 This paper then attempts to quantify the economic significance of these results by 
interpreting plausible changes in charter schools on median real estate sale prices. The 
panel regression indicates that if a zip code were to go from having 0 charter schools to 
having 3 charters, putting it in the top quintile of tested zip codes, the average value of 
home sales would decrease by $40,171. If a zip code had 4 charter schools, putting it in 
the top 10%, the model indicates that the average value of home sales would decrease by 
$53,562. For the highest charter present zip code, at 16 charters, the data expects a home 
price decrease of $214,245. This suggests that charter school presence is highly 
economically significant in this panel model.  
 The model then attempts to separate the years tested around those of the ‘great 
recession,’ as shown in Table 2. During the recession years of 2008 – 2010 the 
coefficient given for charter schools is slightly positive. In all other year groups 
surrounding the recession, the effect is negative (columns 2-4). Then I try to see if the 
early charter trend was met with a different response (column 1). I find that in the years 
prior to 2000 home prices may have been slightly positively affected by charter school 
openings. This would make sense because after the tester phase of the original charter 
schools in the 90’s, Los Angeles ramped up its charter effort. Presumably that is 
indication that the early charters were effective and beneficial. However, in no grouping 
of years is the effect significant at the 5% level. Thus I have inconclusive results about 
the effect of the recession or any other shifts on charter school effect. You can, however, 
21 
 
speculate that the generally decreasing coefficient on number of schools may suggest a 
growing dissatisfaction with charter schools.19  
 In Table 3 I use a binary variable for five segmentations of charter presence: no 
charters, one charter, two charters, three charters, and four or more charters. Total 
charters, from the Table 1 original panel regression, are also present to serve as a 
reference point. Data statistics for each of these segmentations can be found in the 
Appendix.  Here I find that no single binary variable is quite as significant as the total 
charter variable present in the first panel regression (Table 1). However, I also find that 
first and last segmentations of 0 charters and 4 or more charters produce statistically 
significant results at the 1% level. The results on these regressions further corroborate our 
previous models in the suggestion that increasing charter schools decreases home sale 
value. One exception to this is the coefficient for home sale price for the three charter 
segmentation, which is curiously positive. However, this regression is not significant at 
the 5% level, so I do not find that it provides compelling opposition to our other models.  
 The decrease in home values around charter schools could be caused by a variety 
of factors; an indication factor, implausibility of the best charter schools, unreliable 
curricula, and previously failing public schools ranking among them. There is some 
possibility that the presence of charter schools signifies to those in Los Angeles that a 
certain area is undesirable. Given that charter schools are most likely to open in low 
income areas, shown in Map 1, it is possible that others that may have considered a 
                                                          
19
 These models were also tested with interest rate as an explanatory variable; however, I found that interest 
rate was not influential in the model and had negligible effect.  
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certain area will come to see charter schools as a ‘red herring’ of sorts.20 A charter may 
indicate to families that are moving that a specific area has failing public schools. These 
families would then be deterred from moving to the charter area.  
 Another common experience in Los Angeles particularly is the difficulty of 
getting into top charter schools. Ostensibly, the effect of increased home desirability 
would be an offshoot of charter school desirability. However, many charters in Los 
Angeles like Larchmont Elementary or Los Feliz Charter School for the Arts use a lottery 
system to admit students.2122 This means that moving to the area of the school would not 
improve school choice for most; rather only the lucky few admitted would have incentive 
to move to the area.  
 Deterrents of charter schools cite their poor accountability as one of the primary 
arguments against them. This notorious reputation may be one pushing more parents out 
of the charter system in Los Angeles. While most charter schools follow fairly traditional 
curriculum, some like the failed MATTIE academy or the current School of Extended 
Educational Opportunities choose to focus on either certain disciplines or largely untested 
methods of teaching.23 Particularly in low-income areas where residents have 
traditionally lower mobility, these schools fail to provide an enticing reason for 
education-minded families to relocate. 
                                                          
20
 Map 1 does not include price data for all Los Angeles county zip codes because the 2013 data for all 
counties is not yet public.  
21
 Maddaus, Gene. "Charter Schools: Getting Your Child on the List." LA Times. October 13, 2011. 
Accessed November 27, 2013. http://www.laweekly.com/2011-10-13/news/charter-schools-getting-your-
child-on-the-list/. 
 
23
 "State Numbered Charter Schools in California (CA Dept of Education)." State Numbered Charter 
Schools in California (CA Dept of Education). Accessed November 30, 2013. 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/si/cs/ap/rpt.asp?page=64. 
 
 
23 
 
 Another compelling reason why charter schools may have this effect is their 
previous incarnation. While some charters are buildings transformed into schools, or are 
even newly built, others are simply transitioned failing public schools. Schools like 
Locke High School in the Watts area of Los Angeles have a history of being poor 
performing public schools, and their conversion to charter serves as only an effort to 
salvage them. In fact, in 2012, the San Fernando Valley saw 24 low API schools petition 
for charters in the hopes that non-traditional curricula would increase their performance.24 
If this is a common practice in Los Angeles, it is only rational that the residual effects of 
the previous failing schools would continue to plague the post-conversion charter 
schools. 
 The difference in effect before 2000 and after can be somewhat accounted for 
simply by presence. While only 22 current charter schools opened their doors in the 
1990’s, throughout the first decade of the 2000’s, 161 new ones were launched. In the 
three years since then, a striking 124 additional schools of charter status have opened in 
the city. It is very possible that as the citizens of Los Angeles became more familiar with 
charter schools, their disenchantment with them became more pronounced.  
 
 
                                                          
24
 Blume, Howard, and Stephen Ceasar. "24 San Fernando Valley Schools Seek Charter Status." Los 
Angeles Times. May 02, 2012. Accessed November 30, 2013. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/02/local/la-me-charters-20120502. 
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Figure 1 
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Table 1: Home Sale Price with Zip Code Binary 
  1997-2013 1997-2013 
Variable Median Home Sale Price 
Ln Median Home Sale 
Price 
Number of 
Charter Schools -$13,390.6*** -$0.00342 
  (3311.00) (0.00) 
  
 
  
1998 -$10,219.9 0.0287* 
  (11904.20) (0.01) 
  
 
  
1999 $5193.0 0.0679*** 
  (11876.30) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2000 $24,387.5* 0.131*** 
  (11839.70) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2001 $43,640.8*** 0.198*** 
  (11892.20) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2002 $92,213.1*** 0.325*** 
  (11844.30) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2003 $160,747.9*** 0.494*** 
  (11832.80) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2004 $266,203.2*** 0.710*** 
  (11823.70) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2005 $371,185.3*** 0.891*** 
  (11832.60) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2006 $414,591.7*** 0.965*** 
  (11911.60) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2007 $408,328.9*** 0.941*** 
  (11998.00) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2008 $316,096.7*** 0.746*** 
  (12600.90) (0.01) 
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Table 1 Continued: Home Sale Price with Zip Code Binary 
  1997-2013 1997-2013 
Variable Median Home Sale Price 
Ln Median Home Sale 
Price 
  
 
  
2009 $219,872.8*** 0.554*** 
  (12330.10) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2010 $218,815.9*** 0.537*** 
  (12225.70) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2011 $195,448.8*** 0.485*** 
  (12296.80) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2012 $167,239.7*** 0.434*** 
  (12347.80) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2013 $225,681.9*** 0.555*** 
  (12371.80) (0.01) 
  
 
  
_cons $310,234.6*** 12.46*** 
  (8476.20) (0.01) 
------------ ----------------   
Observations 4100 4100 
------------ ----------------   
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 2: Segmented Median Home Price by Charter Presence 
 
  1997-1999 1997-2007 2008-2010 2011-2013 
Variable 
Med Home 
Price 
Med Home 
Price 
Med Home 
Price 
Med Home 
Price 
Number of 
Charter 
Schools $16,751.5 -$15,417.8 $3,189.7 -$21,156.7 
  (92213.20) (8528.90) (25489.50) (16188.70) 
  
   
  
1998 -$9,977.2 -$9,742.6 . . 
  (16750.90) (11028.40) . . 
  
   
  
1999 $5,795.8 $5,201.6 . . 
  (16865.50) (11005.50) . . 
  
   
  
2000 . $24,480.6* . . 
  . (10973.20) . . 
  
   
  
2001 . $44,068.3*** . . 
  . (11028.40) . . 
  
   
  
2002 . $91,780.8*** . . 
  . (11001.10) . . 
  
   
  
2003 . $159,853.2*** . . 
  . (11045.50) . . 
  
   
  
2004 . $267,447.7*** . . 
  . (11079.70) . . 
  
   
  
2005 . $372,238.7*** . . 
  . (11166.90) . . 
  
   
  
2006 . $415,444.4*** . . 
  . (11374.20) . . 
  
   
  
2007 . . . . 
  . . . . 
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Table 2: Segmented Median Home Price by Charter Presence Continued 
 
  1997-1999 1997-2007 2008-2010 2011-2013 
Variable 
Med Home 
Price 
Med Home 
Price 
Med Home 
Price 
Med Home 
Price 
  
   
  
2008 . . . . 
  . . . . 
  
   
  
2009 . . -$92,906.6*** . 
  . . (12312.20) . 
  
   
  
2010 . . -$91,861.5*** . 
  . . (12790.60) . 
  
   
  
2011 . . . $27,626.7** 
  . . . (10431.50) 
  
   
  
2012 . . . . 
  . . . . 
  
   
  
2013 . . . $60,611.4*** 
  . . . (10460.40) 
  
   
  
_cons $306,547.2*** $307,327.8*** $625,073.2*** $484,599.4*** 
  (13331.20) (7875.80) (15820.20) (16831.20) 
  
   
  
Number of 
Observations 728 2485 660 710 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 3: Basic Panel and Log-Level Regressions with Charter Binaries 
 
  Home Sale Price 
Log Home Sale 
Price 
Original 
Panel -$13,390.6*** -0.00342 
  (3311.00) (0.00) 
  
 
  
0 Charters $25,640.4** -0.0275** 
  (9015.50) (0.01) 
  
 
  
1 Charter $4,498.3 0.0308** 
  (8555.90) (0.01) 
  
 
  
2 Charters -$33,659.3** 0.00643 
  (12237.60) (0.01) 
  
 
  
3 Charters $3,454.2 0.00729 
  (17923.60) (0.02) 
  
 
  
4 Charters -$42,169.6** -0.0331* 
  (16086.00) (0.02) 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
   
 
  
 Map 1: 
*Black points on the map signify charter school locations 
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Crime 
 In order to test the possibility of any other derivatives of opening charter schools, 
I regress the year on year crime rate to the number of charter schools in Los Angeles 
locations under the Sherriff’s duty. Table 4 shows the regression of crime rates with 
fixed effects on zip codes, in the table the first two columns show the regressions with 
median real estate price as a variable, and the second two without. I find that charter 
schools appear to have a slightly positive relationship with crime – this relationship, 
however, is not statistically significant. While I expected an increase in Type 2 crimes, 
the positive association is also present with Type 1 crimes. In regressions run using real 
estate sale numbers as an independent variable, I find that Type 1 crimes increase by 
approximately 5 crimes reported to the increase of one charter school, and Type 2 crimes 
increase by approximately 8.5 crimes reported.   
In order to give context to the economic significance of this negative relationship 
I perform a plausible economic significance test.  The panel regression shows that if a zip 
code were to transition from 0 charter schools to three charter schools, on average Type 1 
crimes would increase by about 13.26. Given that the mean Type 1 crimes reported to the 
Los Angeles Sheriff is 87.55, this 18% increase appears to be economically significant. 
For Type 2 crimes, an increase in 3 charter schools would lead to approximately 26 
additional crimes per year. With a mean reported crime rate of 110.4, this would be a 
24% increase. This suggests that charter schools effect on crime rates may be 
economically significant, though not statistically significant.  
 Next I attempt to dismantle this relationship into times when schools are closed. 
Given in Table 5 are the results from running a variation of the panel regression without 
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including the summer months and only using crimes committed between 5PM and 7AM. 
Columns 1 and 2 include median real estate sale price as a variable, where columns 3 and 
4 do not. This demonstrates a slightly positive relationship between charter schools and 
crime, and again, this relationship is non-significant.  
 I also test whether the relationship between charter schools and crime is more 
pronounced during school hours. One would expect that these would be the hours most 
likely to impact crime. This expectation is based off of the fact that there is a higher 
chance of being apprehended at times when more people in an area. While students 
would ostensibly be in class at a different school if the charter were not present, it is 
possible charter schools have an effect on school attendance. This is particularly possible 
if charter schools are generally a better alternative to their neighborhood schools, as 
previously hypothesized. Table 6 shows the relationship between total charter schools 
and crimes committed when schools are open. Again, however, this relationship is 
positive. The relationship between Type 1 crimes and charter school openings is 
significant at the 1% level when median household sale prices are included. The model 
suggests that for every additional charter school opening, Type 1 crimes go up by 
approximately 4.42. This suggests that charter schools lower neighborhood safety, 
contrary to my hypothesis.   
 Lastly, I test whether binary stratification of number of charter schools leads to 
more significant results for either log-level regressions or basic panel regressions in 
Table 7. Again, the non-binary, original panel results are in row 1. I find that the data is 
insignificant for most regressions, however is consistently significant for the binary of 
four charters or more. This may indicate that charter schools en masse affect crime rates, 
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or that both crime and the opening of charter schools may both be symptom of declining 
neighborhood quality. This possibility is further demonstrated in Map 2 and Map 3 
which show 2012 crime (Type 1 and Type 2 respectively) in relation to charter school 
locations. 
 This possible increase in crime rates can be explained by much the same 
reasoning as the decline in real estate rates. If charter schools do, in fact, drive down real 
estate prices, the clientele that move into the neighborhoods with lowered home values 
will likely be lower income. Research has proven that lower income housing areas tend to 
result in higher crime rates, thus it is only natural that this effect would persist in Los 
Angeles.2526 
 It is also plausible that charter schools bring low-income families to 
neighborhoods driving out previous residents. Particularly, it is possible that single, 
young adults now have less incentive to live in the area, and are largely pushed out by 
families. This would then increase the low-income population, and thus crime. It is also 
possible this is a relevant factor in decreasing real estate prices over time as this trend 
continues.   
  
                                                          
25
 Srivastava, Pragati. Impact of Low Income Multifamily Housing on Crime Trends in Dallas Texas. 
School of Architecture, University of Texas at Austin. December 16, 2006. Accessed November 25, 2013. 
http://soa.utexas.edu/files/gis/CrimeMultifamilyHousingDallas.pdf. 
26
 Freedman, Matthew, and Emily G. Owens. "Low-income Housing Development and Crime." Journal of 
Urban Economics 70, no. 2-3 (2011): 115-31. doi:10.1016/j.jue.2011.04.001. 
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Table 4: Crimes by Number of Charter Schools 
  2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 
Variable Type 1 Crimes Type 2 Crimes Type 1 Crimes Type 2 Crimes 
Number of Charter 
Schools 5.139 8.664 4.35  5.39  
  (5.31) (11.32) (4.21) (8.94) 
  
   
  
Home Price 0.0000267 0.000062 . . 
  (0.00) (0.00) . . 
  
   
  
2006 -14.22 -4.225 -12.59 -1.43 
  (9.84) (20.95) (8.93) (18.99) 
  
   
  
2007 2.655 17.44 2.96  18.47  
  (9.88) (21.04) (8.93) (18.99) 
  
   
  
2008 1.586 33.39 1.13  32.81  
  (10.55) (22.48) (8.95) (19.04) 
  
   
  
2009 -17.4 6.052 -20.09* -1.96 
  (10.93) (23.28) (9.01) (19.15) 
  
   
  
2010 -12.25 16.73 -13.73 10.68  
  (10.85) (23.11) (9.10) (19.34) 
  
   
  
2011 -16.61 -20.8 -19.64* -24.78 
  (11.26) (23.98) (9.22) (19.60) 
  
   
  
2012 -12.14 205.2*** -14.47 185.1*** 
  (11.71) (24.94) (9.33) (19.84) 
  
   
  
_cons 178.7*** 196.1*** 187.0*** 226.4*** 
  (18.09) (38.55) (6.48) (13.79) 
------------ ------------------- ------------- 
 
  
Number of 
Observations 1801 1801 2057 2057 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 5: Crimes by Type During Non-School Hours 
  2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 
Variable Type 1 Crimes 
Type 2 
Crimes 
Type 1 
Crimes 
Type 2 
Crimes 
Number of Charter 
Schools 4.548 4.162 2.327 1.84 
  (2.32) (6.76) (1.70) (4.81) 
  
   
  
Home Price 0.00000266 0.0000131 
 
  
  (0.00) (0.00) 
 
  
  
   
  
2006 -1.189 -1.657 -2.565 -2.946 
  (6.90) (20.13) (5.99) (16.89) 
  
   
  
2007 17.28* 29.62          16.10** 29.61 
  (6.71) (19.59) (5.84) (16.48) 
  
   
  
2008 -4.791 1.293 -2.131 7.191 
  (7.44) (21.70) (5.81) (16.40) 
  
   
  
2009 -11.84 -22.05 -10.52 -15.96 
  (7.30) (21.30) (5.85) (16.50) 
  
   
  
2010 -8.684 -14.51 -7.214 -12.72 
  (7.21) (21.04) (6.01) (16.97) 
  
   
  
2011 -18.39* -20.26           -13.73* -14.35 
  (7.44) (21.72) (6.08) (17.15) 
  
   
  
2012 -13.01 72.00** -6.157        71.39*** 
  (7.81) (22.78) (6.24) (17.61) 
  
   
  
_cons 59.12*** 72.07**        59.82***        75.88*** 
  (9.03) (26.35) -4.788 -13.51 
------------ ------------------- ------------- ----------------- ------------ 
Number of 
Observations 504 504 616 616 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 6: Crimes By Type During School Hours 
  2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 2005 - 2012 
Variable Type 1 Crimes 
Type 2 
Crimes 
Type 1 
Crimes 
Type 2 
Crimes 
Number of Charter 
Schools 4.472** -0.884 1.87 0.919 
  (1.67) (7.45) (1.59) (3.58) 
  
   
  
Home Price 0.00000136 0.0000164 
 
  
  (0.00) (0.00) 
 
  
  
   
  
2006 -3.204 -4.297 -5.025 -0.869 
  (5.06) (22.57) (3.56) (8.00) 
  
   
  
2007 16.65*** 15.56        16.28***            20.10* 
  (4.96) (22.10) (3.49) (7.85) 
  
   
  
2008 1.744 3.377 2.481 11.71 
  (5.48) (24.42) (3.51) (7.89) 
  
   
  
2009 -4.115 -17.15 -3.913 0.891 
  (5.42) (24.15) (3.51) (7.88) 
  
   
  
2010 -1.211 -7.565 -2.275 3.418 
  (5.30) (23.63) (3.54) (7.96) 
  
   
  
2011 -8.978 -12.84 -3.882 -7.095 
  (5.55) (24.73) (3.59) (8.06) 
  
   
  
2012 -7.304 90.73*** -3.906        78.95*** 
  (5.76) (25.68) (3.63) (8.16) 
  
   
  
_cons 42.21*** 61.58*        64.23***        73.03*** 
  (6.43) (28.66) -2.534 -5.695 
------------ ------------------ -------------- ----------------- ------------ 
Number of 
Observations 512 512 1919 1919 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 7: Log-Level and Basic Crime with Stratified Charter Binaries 
    Type 1 Type 2 Ln Type1 Ln Type2 
Full Year 
Original 
Panel 4.345 5.394 0.0404 .0480* 
    (4.21) (8.94) (0.02) (0.02) 
  0 Charters 5.894 -51.05 0.071 -0.0302 
    (13.10) (27.82) (0.07) (0.06) 
  1 Charter 1.295 50.89* 0.00692 0.000582 
    (10.62) (22.55) (0.06) (0.05) 
  2 Charters -22.81 -30.49 -0.178* -0.0633 
    13.52  (28.76) (0.07) (0.06) 
  3 Charters -12.29 -30.12 -0.0477 -0.0924 
    (16.56) (35.21) (0.09) (0.08) 
  4 Charters 38.86* 38.63 .192* .268** 
    (17.71 (37.69) (0.09) (0.08) 
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Table 7: Log-Level and Basic Crime with Stratified Charter Binaries Continued 
    Type 1 Type 2 Ln Type1 Ln Type2 
School 
Open 
Original 
Panel 1.87 0.919 0.0381 .0715** 
    (1.59) (3.58) (0.02) (0.02) 
  0 Charters 1.48 -19.31 -0.0174 -0.0387 
    (5.10) (11.45) (0.07) (0.07) 
  1 Charter -0.549 17.74 0.00148 -0.0356 
    (4.11) (9.32) (0.06) (0.06) 
  2 Charters -6.559 -6.145 -0.0859 0.0161 
    (5.24) (11.78) (0.08) 0.07  
  3 Charters -3.968 -11.23 -0.0226 -0.202* 
    (6.36) (14.29) (0.09) (0.09) 
  4 Charters 14.19* 8.828 0.169 .367** 
    (6.73) (15.14) (0.09) (0.10) 
    
   
  
School 
Closed 
Original 
Panel 2.327 1.84 0.0441 0.0472 
    (1.70) (4.81) (0.03) (0.03) 
  0 Charters -37.33 -57.25 -0.213 0.318 
    (22.64) (39.10) (0.24) (0.22) 
  1 Charter 4.33 17.96 0.0831 -0.0457 
    (5.91) (10.20) (0.06) (0.06) 
  2 Charters -15.26* -15.35 -0.17* -0.0278 
    (7.28) (12.58) (0.08) (0.07) 
  3 Charters -2.512 -10.68 -0.159 -.0322 
    (8.70) (15.01) (0.10) (0.09) 
  4 Charters 7.95 0.833 0.0926 0.0465 
    (5.43) (9.38) 0.06  0.05  
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
   *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001 
    
 
 
 
 Map 2 
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 Map 3 
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Robustness 
In order to determine the validity of these models I check the robustness of the 
basic panel regressions by seeing the impact of various independent variables on the 
dependent variables. In the real estate price regressions I use the basic panel regression, 
which correlates the presence of charter schools to inflation adjusted median sale prices 
of homes, with years and zip codes as fixed effect independent variables. In this model 
when I drop the zip code independent variable I find only a 1.4% decrease in the 
coefficient for charter schools. This test implies that the model used is strong. Next I 
attempt to find the influence of the year fixed effects by dropping the variable. Here the 
change is far more pronounced with a 300% increase in the coefficient for charter schools 
– this indicates inconclusive results on the robustness of the model. 
I perform the same check on the basic crime model, which regresses total charter 
schools on Type 1 and Type 2 crimes, respectively, with years and zip codes as fixed 
effect independent variables. For Type 1 crimes, when I drop the zip code I find a 35% 
change in the coefficient for charter impact – a change from 4.34 crimes to 2.84; when I 
drop the year variable I find an even larger 87% decrease in the coefficient, to .58 crimes. 
Given that both changes are fairly notable I find that the results of this test are 
inconclusive. 
For Type 2 crimes I use the same model to check. When I drop the zip code I find 
a 66% decrease in the crime coefficient – from 5.39 to 1.81; when I drop the year 
variable I find a 387% increase in the coefficient to 26.31. While this indicates that Type 
2 crimes have increased over the years, it is inconclusive for the purposes of robustness.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
While the past 20 years have seen a surge in Los Angeles charter schools, the 
surrounding neighborhoods have only suffered with the increase. While the results of this 
study are largely inconclusive, they indicate that real estate values fall and crime 
increases (perhaps co-dependently) as charter schools open in neighborhoods. Given that 
charter schools tend to open in the poorest urban neighborhoods, the need for increased 
real estate values and decreased crime is more poignant. Thus these results are important 
in order to evaluate if urban areas benefit from charter schools beyond, and regardless of, 
API scores and school quality. 
The decrease in real estate values found is significant at a fairly high level, 
however, it does not necessarily mean that the charter school is causing the decrease. 
Rather there are a sundry of other reasons for which charter neighborhoods may suffer 
around this time; some of these possibilities, such as the red herring effect, are still 
caused directly by charters. It is also possible that Los Angeles’ previous captivation of 
charter schools has ended, and it is only desperation to fix public schools that keeps 
pushing their creation. Alternatively, perhaps charter school creators are predicting 
change that is likely to occur in an area. None of these theories, however, can be 
confirmed by this study. I also find a slight, but insignificant and inconclusive increase in 
crime. In order to be able to find this effect, further research must be conducted. Further 
research may be able to consider pulse surveys on families in urban areas to eliminate 
many of these potential causes. 
While charter schools are not developed directly with the intention of increasing 
real estate value and decreasing crime rates, this research may provide further insight on 
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urban charters and their neighborhoods. Particularly, if the only consistent measure of 
charter schools is their API and testing, it may be important to see if they leave or attract 
more developed populous in their wake. A real estate value decrease, such as the one 
indicated by this study, could also signal that charter schools are serving more 
disadvantaged students than they had originally expected. These results may then be able 
to proxy as a pulse report for the general disposition towards charter schools in Los 
Angeles.  
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VI. APPENDIX 
All Observations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 4539 0.433796 1.124162 0 16 
Average Home Sale Price 4100 487420.1 328172.4 64060 4900000 
Ln Avg Home Sale Price 4100 12.93308 0.557873 11.06758 15.41202 
# Type 1 Crimes in Year 1861 87.55723 173.8342 0 1251 
# Type 2 Crimes in Year 1861 110.425 233.2245 0 2473 
Ln of Type 1 Crimes in 
year 
1553 2.900739 2.155745 0 7.131699 
Ln of Type 2 Crimes in 
Year 
1773 2.877377 2.118858 0 7.813187 
Zip Code 4539     90001 93591 
Year 4539     1997 2013 
            
0 Charter Observations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 3542         
Average Home Sale Price 3246 479438.2 306072.4 64060 3000000 
Ln Avg Home Sale Price 3246 12.92035 0.557511 11.06758 14.92211 
# Type 1 Crimes in Year 1245 84.6996 170.398 0 1251 
# Type 2 Crimes in Year 1245 104.4257 217.7215 0 1767 
Ln of Type 1 Crimes in 
year 
1025 2.895509 2.146342 0 7.131699 
Ln of Type 2 Crimes in 
Year 
1186 2.822796 2.116988 0 7.477038 
Zip Code 3542     90001 93591 
Year 3542     1997 2013 
            
1 Charter Observations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 542         
Average Home Sale Price 461 516077.9 409361.3 107339 3000000 
Ln Avg Home Sale Price 461 12.97087 0.5645736 11.58375 14.89749 
# Type 1 Crimes in Year 311 78.09325 158.5335 0 1050 
# Type 2 Crimes in Year 311 94.04823 190.4513 0 1375 
Ln of Type 1 Crimes in 
year 
280 2.744963 2.088304 0 6.956545 
Ln of Type 2 Crimes in 
Year 
295 2.971815 1.95861 0 7.226209 
Zip Code 542     90001 93591 
Year 542     1997 2013 
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2 Charter Observations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 239         
Average Home Sale Price 204 510823.7 377920.1 149038 4900000 
Ln Avg Home Sale Price 204 13.01433 0.4798374 11.91196 15.41202 
# Type 1 Crimes in Year 157 127.6752 229.4621 0 1161 
# Type 2 Crimes in Year 157 150.5096 279.5644 0 1390 
Ln of Type 1 Crimes in 
year 
134 3.053925 2.336358 0 7.057037 
Ln of Type 2 Crimes in 
Year 
149 3.028182 2.298156 0 7.237059 
Zip Code 239     90003 93550 
Year 239     1997 2013 
            
3 Charter Observations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 97         
Average Home Sale Price 83 719083.7 521031.1 115373 2100000 
Ln Avg Home Sale Price 83 13.24917 0.6836636 11.65593 14.58047 
# Type 1 Crimes in Year 74 90.09459 161.1372 0 807 
# Type 2 Crimes in Year 74 121.0811 239.2053 0 1522 
Ln of Type 1 Crimes in 
year 
51 3.198178 2.385448 0 6.693324 
Ln of Type 2 Crimes in 
Year 
72 2.706141 2.298086 0 7.327781 
Zip Code 97     90003 93550 
Year 97     1998 2013 
            
4 Charter Observations Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 119 5.529412 2.216363 4 16 
Average Home Sale Price 106 380772.8 162171.9 119075 730606 
Ln Avg Home Sale Price 106 12.75472 0.4494474 11.68751 13.50163 
# Type 1 Crimes in Year 74 87.75676 161.0879 0 692 
# Type 2 Crimes in Year 74 184.4865 434.7082 0 2473 
Ln of Type 1 Crimes in 
year 
63 3.111555 2.010668 0 6.539586 
Ln of Type 2 Crimes in 
Year 
71 3.253882 2.199244 0 7.813187 
Zip Code 119     90003 93550 
Year 119     2004 2013 
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Only zip codes with 
Charters 
Obs2 Mean3 Std. Dev.4 Min Max 
Number of Charters 1920 1.025 1.543329 0 16 
Average Home Sale Price 1690 452153.4 330505.2 64060 4900000 
Zipcodes 1920 90727.59   90001 93591 
years 1920 2004.996   1997 2013 
Zip codes with No 
Charters 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Charters 2618         
Average Home Sale Price 2409 512276.1 324323.8 78348.5 3000000 
Zipcodes 2618 90997.39   90010 93552 
years 2618 2005   1997 2013 
Average Home Sale Price 2409 512276.1 324323.8 78348.5 3000000 
 
